Kohima Read online

  But if the overall strategic picture was depressing, the situation in the 14th Army had improved. The personality of Slim and the tonic of Mountbatten’s whirlwind visits had improved morale considerably. And the administrative build-up at Imphal, at Dimapur, and in the Arakan had gone on steadily. In the latter sector, there were the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions, both battle-hardened formations constituting the 15th Corps under Lieut.-General Christison; and at Imphal there were the 17th, 20th and 23rd Indian Divisions in Scoones’ 4th Corps. It was not a very large Army; but it was much bigger than the force which had been thrown out of Burma in 1942.

  The Japanese forces had been reinforced, too, with the arrival of the 31st Division in August. The following month Mutaguchi, who had taken over command of the 15th Army in March 1943, ordered his divisions to prepare for the offensive. In 1942, as a divisional commander, he had strongly opposed an attack on Imphal, but now he was just as strongly for it, and urged his views on General Kawabe, the Burma Area Army commander. It is said that Mutaguchi had been impressed by the achievements of Wingate’s first operation, and argued that, given dry weather and detailed planning, an army could advance over the jungle-mountains and still retain the strength to fight a battle. General Kawabe was not so certain, and pointed out the difficulty of maintaining an army at the end of such a long and tenuous line of communication; but, in his usual manner, Mutaguchi bulldozed his ideas through, until gradually they were accepted by Southern Army and Imperial Headquarters. As it happened, Mutaguchi’s plan came at the right time for the Tojo government. With the succession of defeats in the Pacific at Guadalcanal, at Midway Island, and in New Guinea, the strategic situation was changing. Also, as the American blockade was tightening its grip, the shipping losses were mounting, and the morale of the civilian population needed a fillip. A victory in Burma would undoubtedly provide this; and would pay other dividends too. The Chinese divisions hovering on the northern Burmese borders, like vultures waiting for the kill, would be hurriedly withdrawn; the British, with the loss of Imphal, would be paralysed, so far as any future offensives were concerned; and India might well rise in rebellion. Subhas Chandra Bose, commander of the renegade ‘Indian National Army’, was confidently predicting that revolt was simmering just beneath the surface, and with one more British reverse nothing could stop it bursting into fury from Bombay to Calcutta, from Madras to Delhi. Mutaguchi believed him; and the High Command believed Mutaguchi.

  So in October and November the staffs got down to detailed planning. The object of the operation was: ‘To upset the British base around Imphal in order to suppress the British counter-offensive. To strengthen the defence of Burma and to exercise political control over India.’ The ‘Scheme of the Operation’ was ‘…to rush into Imphal as quickly as possible and give the Allies no chance to make a counter-offensive.’ As the conferences went on week after week plans were modified, and at one stage it was decided that if the 15th Army was successful at Imphal it would then occupy Kohima with powerful forces and ‘expect to secure that area in order to establish permanent occupation’. Later on, however, when the tactical importance of Kohima was more fully appreciated, it was decided that a whole division should march there. Having seized the town, it would prevent the British sending down reinforcements to Imphal, slaughter the troops retreating from Imphal, and, if called on, send a regiment to join in the main action. On the 7th December, the second anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbour, the Japanese Prime Minister’s broadcast from Tokyo: ‘Now, on the threshold of a new year, Japan will seek to consolidate her gains; she will go on doing so until ultimate victory is attained.’

  By January 1944 Mountbatten and Slim were quite aware that the Japanese offensive was coming. In December the 31st Division had been identified at Homalin, and some weeks later the 15th Division was identified also. To quote Slim:

  ‘Enemy activity and strength all along 4 Corps front were noticeably increasing. Documents, diaries, marked maps, and even operation orders taken from Japanese killed in these patrol clashes were being brought in almost daily. All these clues, painstakingly fitted into the mosaic of our intelligence at Corps and Army Headquarters, began to give us a general picture of the enemy’s intentions.’

  Air reconnaissance brought back information of camouflaged rafts being concealed in the lower reaches of the Uyu River, opposite Homalin, and herds of cattle near Thaungdut on the Chindwin. And agents from ‘V’ Force, the Intelligence Screen, also brought in stories ‘of the massing of transport, mechanical and animal, even of elephants’. By the end of January, Slim had a fairly comprehensive picture of the whole Japanese order of battle. As to Mutaguchi’s intentions, Slim in conference with Scoones decided that these would be as follows:

  ‘…first, to capture Imphal, and second, to break through to the Brahmaputra Valley so as to cut off the Northern front and disrupt the air supply to China.… A Japanese regiment would, we foresaw, make for Kohima to cut the main Imphal-Dimapur road and threaten the Dimapur base. We calculated the offensive would begin about the 15th March.’

  To meet the threat to Imphal, Slim decided to let the 17th and 20th Indian Divisions fall back on the Imphal Plain, and fight the battle there. ‘I was tired,’ he said, ‘of fighting the Japanese when they had a good line of communications behind them and I had an execrable one. This time I would reverse the procedure.’ Nevertheless, Slim was conscious that the forces available to cover Assam were most inadequate and discussed with General Giffard the movement of the 5th Indian Division from the Arakan, and, later on, the 7th Division, when a formation could be brought from India to replace it. The staff at nth Army Group, however, considered that these movements would overstrain the railway system; and, after considerable argument, Giffard suggested a compromise. This was that he would send Slim the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, consisting of two battalions, and would put in hand ‘arrangements for moving the 2nd British Division if it became urgently necessary to do so’.

  Believing that only a Japanese regiment would advance on Kohima, and even this must move slowly and painfully over the difficult country, Slim did not greatly concern himself with the situation there. He was soon to be disillusioned.

  *

  Executive orders from Tokyo for the Burma offensive reached Kawabe on the 7th January, and after a fortnight’s delay he issued his orders to Mutaguchi. (This was about the day that Churchill was writing in a memo to General Ismay: ‘This report [by the Joint Intelligence Staff on Japanese Intentions in Burma] confirms the view I have held for some time that the danger of invasion of India by Japan has passed.’) A month later Chandra Bose was exhorting the I.N.A. troops with a ‘Special Order of the Day’. ‘Comrades, Officers and Men of India’s Army of Liberation. Let there be one solemn resolve in your hearts—“Either Liberty or Death”. And let there be but one slogan on your lips—“Onward to Delhi” …Victory will certainly be yours.’ Three days later, on the 18th February, Mutaguchi issued his own Order:

  ‘The Army has now reached the stage of invincibility and the day when the Rising Sun shall proclaim our definite victory in India is not far off.

  This operation will engage the attention of the whole world and is eagerly awaited by 100,000,000 of our countrymen. By its very decisive nature, its success will have a profound effect upon the course of the war and may even lead to its conclusion….

  I will remind you that a speedy and successful advance is the keynote of this operation… despite all the obstacles of the river, mountain and labyrinthine jungle. Aided by the Gods and inspired by the Emperor and full of the will to win, we must realize the objectives of this operation…. Both officers and men must fight to the death for their country and accept the burden of duties which are the lot of the soldier of Japan.

  The will of the Emperor and our countrymen must be fulfilled.’

  By this time the Arakan diversion launched by the 55th Division on the 4th February had shot its bolt, but learning that the 5th Indian Division was now c
ommitted, Mutaguchi was not unsatisfied. The second stage of his plan could go ahead as scheduled.

  *

  While Mutaguchi was issuing his Order of the Day, a unit called the 1st Assam Regiment was packing up at its quarters at Digboi in northeast Assam to move to Kohima. This regiment had only been raised in June 1941, with some initial help from the Assam Rifles, and had mobilized six months later. Commanded by British officers, the sepoys included Nagas, Lushais, Khasis, and Assamese, and the language problems were almost insoluble. However, under the leadership of an energetic commander, Lieut.-Colonel ‘Bruno’ Brown, these and a good many other problems were overcome, and in April 1942 the battalion moved up to join the 23rd Indian Division, and patrolled towards the Chindwin. A year later it was back in Digboi, more experienced, but pitifully short of clothing and equipment. The orders for a ceremonial parade on the 23rd May are nothing short of Gilbertian and make one wonder why on earth the unit didn’t disintegrate:

  ‘C Coy will borrow side caps from D Coy.

  D Coy will borrow steel helmets from C Coy.

  A Coy will borrow side caps from B Coy.

  Headquarters Company will lend D Coy any further steel helmets of which they may be deficient.’

  However, as Napoleon put it, ‘the moral is to the physical as three to one’ and six months later the unit was ready for battle. On the 22nd February it arrived at Kohima and took up its quarters in the 57th Reinforcement Camp. Initially, it came under command of Brigadier Hope-Thompson of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, which was to be positioned near Ukhrul, thirty-five miles Northeast of Imphal; and its orders were to form firm bases at Jessami and Kharasom, and Phakekedzumi (commonly known as ‘Phek’) and guard all exits from the Somra Tracts east of Kohima by extensive use of patrols. The battalion would have a company of the 1st Burma Regiment under command to man the position at Phek; and it was to maintain close liaison with the forward screens of V Force and the Assam Rifles.

  On the evening of the 23rd February, Charles Pawsey gave the officers of the battalion a farewell cocktail party in his bungalow. This was the last social occasion to be held there; and the last time that all the officers would be together and enjoying themselves. One of them, Peter Steyn, was later to recall the beauty of the garden as he looked out into the evening sunlight, and the laughter and good fellowship inside.

  Next morning the battalion marched for Jessami; and on the 27th, after slithering downhill to the Laniye River, climbed up to Jessami Ridge. By the following day, the whole unit was concentrated there, with the exception of ‘A’ Company under Captain Young which had moved nine miles to the south (eighteen miles along the track) to establish its post at Kharasom. Colonel Brown decided to site his firm base around the junction of two jeep tracks, a quarter of a mile to the south of the village. The spot wasn’t ideal for defence, as it had no permanent water point, and was overlooked by the high ground to the south. But it did have an excellent command of the approaches from the east, north, and west; and there was ready access to the bridle paths leading into the Somra hills, and to Mol-he near the Burma border. Temporary bivouac headquarters were set up to the south of the base; and in the latter the battalion (or such men as weren’t on patrol) got quickly to work making bunkers and foxholes, then linking them up in a defensive system. Meanwhile, food, ammunition, petrol and engineering stores arrived daily by jeep convoy. The perimeter was surrounded then criss-crossed by barbed wire and by the first week of March the whole position presented a very formidable obstacle indeed. From now on the battalion was to patrol—and wait.

  On the 5th March, having flown to Hailakandi to watch the departure of the 77th L.R.P. Brigade for operation ‘Thursday’ (Wingate’s second and most ambitious campaign), Slim flew to Imphal. Here he discussed with Scoones the plans to meet Mutaguchi’s coming offensive, and agreed to the withdrawal of the 17th and 20th Indian Divisions, provided that Scoones gave the orders personally when he was certain that a major offensive had begun. Later Slim asked Giffard to earmark additional troops, in case the situation on the Plain became difficult, and Giffard promised the 25th and 26th Indian Divisions, and the 14th and 23rd L.R.P. Brigades. Slim then arranged to relieve the 5th Indian Division, now engaged in the Arakan, by the 25th Division, as soon as it could arrive. Before he went to bed that night, after a long and anxious day, Slim could be cheered by one thing at least: after withstanding the onslaught of Sakurai’s 55th Division, the 7th Division had now resumed its advance.

  On the 6th March Mutaguchi began to show his hand. Near Tonzang, on the Manipur River, troops of the 214th Regiment began a series of attacks on the British covering detachments. Gradually these increased until it was evident that the whole regiment was coming across. On the 7th March Scoones set his administrative plan in motion; supply points along the lines of withdrawal to Imphal were stocked up, non-combatant units were ordered back to Dimapur, and self-contained boxes around the town of Imphal were set up. On the same day Sum sent orders to the 5th Division that it was to go to Imphal just as soon as it had been relieved by the 25th, and he moved the 50th Parachute Brigade to Imphal. Also that day Tokyo radio announced: ‘The March on Delhi has begun… we shall be in Imphal by the 27th.’ And, by a malicious stroke of fate, Mountbatten was injured near Ledo. Jeeping down a track on the northern front, he had been caught in the eye by a bamboo branch and was taken to an American hospital. Here he remained for four days, during this critical phase of the operations, bandaged and unable to see.

  Meanwhile the Japanese offensive gained momentum, and on the 8th the 2i5th Regiment crossed the Manipur River several miles to the south of Tiddim, then moved north to cut the road behind the 17th Indian Division at milestone 100. On the 9th a Jap column was reported at Kaptel, fifteen miles to the west of Tiddim. On the 10th the pressure grew, and the next day ‘Punch’ Cowan, commander of the 17th Division, having orders to defend Tiddim at all costs, ordered the digging of defensive boxes. On the 12th the advance of the 33rd Japanese Division became known and Scoones was now quite certain that a major offensive had begun, so next day he ordered Cowan to withdraw, and sent forward his only reserves, to help him fight the encircling Japanese columns, clear the road blocks, and gain the safety of the Imphal Plain. But the fact that he had committed his reserves changed his tactical position; it was now imperative that the 5th Indian Division should be flown up at once. Scoones had an intellectual, analytical brain. Slim rates it as the best brain among senior commanders on this front. Also, by nature, he was equipped for the waiting game; though some people considered he did not inspire and encourage sufficiently, that, like Giffard, he over-dwelt on problems and difficulties. However, Slim was confident that he had the right man in the right place and never wavered from this view.

  Three days earlier, on the 10th, with the bandages still covering his eyes, Mountbatten had asked Lieut.-General Sir Henry Pownall, his Chief of Staff, to ascertain what reserves could be moved up to help 4th Corps. The following day he was told that 14 L.R.P. Brigade, a brigade group of the 5th Indian Division, and 23 L.R.P. Brigade were moving up, and that Giffard intended to concentrate the 5th Division in the area immediately it had been relieved from the Arakan. Mountbatten apparently imagined that the relief (and therefore the move of the 5th Division) would take place immediately, as when he learned on the 14th that the Division was still in the Arakan, the situation grew somewhat explosive. The Supremo blamed Giffard for not moving the Division earlier, and for not keeping him informed of the situation while he was in hospital. What Mountbatten did not realize was that on the 6th the Division had gone into action and could not be disengaged any earlier; and also that it was only when Scoones committed his reserves that the situation became desperate. However, this unpleasant interlude had two results, one personal and one military. Mountbatten never trusted Giffard again; and he intervened personally to rush the 161st Brigade from the Arakan to Dimapur. This action was to have a vital effect on the situation at Kohima.

  The circ
umstances of Mountbatten’s intervention were as follows: En route for Delhi, he touched down at Comilla airstrip for a short conference with Slim. The latter explained the situation and asked for aircraft to expedite the move of the 5th Division to Imphal. Mountbatten promised to put matters in hand at once, and proposed to borrow the necessary aircraft from the air ferry. On the 20th March, six days later, he received word from Washington that the United States Chiefs of Staff had agreed that he could divert thirty Dakotas.

  Meanwhile, on the 18th March, there was a further development; Giffard and Slim decided that the 2nd British Division should be moved up to Chittagong and be placed in 14th Army Reserve, the idea being that it should relieve the 7th Indian Division which would then follow the 5th from the Arakan to the Imphal front. Giffard sent this signal off at once, but, as we have already seen, it wasn’t decoded and delivered to Stopford till 7.0 p.m. on the 19th. And it was the 21st before Grover was able to reach Corps headquarters to report.

  Something else happened on the 18th. Lieutenant Lloyd Jones of the Assam Regiment who had taken out a patrol to Mol-he, near the Burma frontier, was surprised to see a column of Nagas approaching in some agitation. He says: ‘…they were full of a story that 300 Japs had crossed the Chindwin and were advancing this way across the Somra Tracts.’

  Lloyd Jones’ first reaction was that it was probably only a Jap patrol, and that the best course was to continue with his own. However, during the night he was woken up by a sentry who pointed to columns of torches moving up the hill towards the stockade—evidence that the panic was widespread, and the villagers were leaving their homes. On the morning of the 19th, the Deputy-Commissioner, Charles Pawsey, arrived with a large party of women and civilian officials; his information was that V Force headquarters at Kuki had been captured. Convinced that the Japanese were in force and carrying out a swift encircling movement, Lloyd Jones rushed back the information to his unit at Jessami, to prevent their being surprised. He also sent a message to V Force headquarters at Imphal, via an Indian Signals unit, though what happened to it once it arrived is not certain.