Kohima Read online

  It was on the 8th that John Harman won his V.C. During the night, so it was discovered, the enemy had established a machine-gun post covering the D.I.S. This meant that if an attack were made, the men of the Royal West Kents could not defend themselves and would be slaughtered if they withdrew. So, ordering the rest of his section to give him covering fire with the Bren, Harman worked his way round to a position from which he could attack the post. Moving forward slowly between the trees, he brought up his rifle and shot one Jap, then another. There were still three of them left, with automatics, but with immense courage Harman fixed his bayonet, then ran up the ridge towards them. By some miracle the Japs all missed him, and then within seconds he was leaping down on them with his bayonet. Watching from a distance, the rest of his section could see his rifle rising and falling as the bayonet went in and came out again. Then there was a scream and a single shot, and the astonished soldiers saw Harman hold up the machine-gun for them to see, then fling it away among the trees. A burst of cheering broke out, and Harman came down from the ridge to start walking back to his section post. Seeing this the men shouted to him to run, to get back into cover, to stop being a bloody fool, but for some unknown reason Harman ignored their entreaties and walked on till the inevitable happened. A machine-gun post further along the ridge that no one had spotted opened up and shot him through the spine.

  Altogether, the 8th wasn’t a happy day, either inside the perimeter or outside it. A patrol from the Jotsoma box, moving back along the Dimapur road to mend a telephone wire, found the road blocked by milestone 36, just to the north of Zubza. The troops manning the block were from Colonel Torikai’s 13 8th Regiment, and they had come across from the Merema Ridge with the object of stopping reinforcements from reaching Kohima. Reconnoitring, they found a spur running across the road and out into the valley, with two pimples on it which would make a most effective defensive position. Immediately they began digging in. So Warren’s force was now besieged just as surely as the garrison he’d set out to relieve, and already Miyazaki was exerting pressure on his right flank. Warren, however, took things calmly. He’d acquired some chickens from the local village, and got his men to construct a chicken run just near the mess. Ian McKillop, a liaison officer from the 5th Brigade, was amazed to see him calmly eating his breakfast eggs, while the guns thundered away in the dell outside and the birds flapped and squawked excitedly. The eggs were supplemented by wild raspberries, which a bihisti (a water carrier) collected on the hillside and brought in for Warren, Grimshaw, his brigade-major, and the other members of the staff. In the evenings, the demands of war were not allowed to interfere with Warren’s favourite game of cards and many enjoyable hands of ‘vingt-et-un’ were played.

  There was no time to play cards in Kohima. At dusk the enemy artillery opened up from the east, the south, and the west, then an attack came in on 53 I.G.H. Spur. It was held in the main, but some of the Japanese succeeded in establishing themselves across the road and began digging in on the lower slopes of the spur. It was impossible to deal with them in the confusion and darkness; a counter-attack had to wait till the morning. Meanwhile, another attack came in on the D.C.’s bungalow at the eastern end of the perimeter. This was helped by a heavy mortar barrage, but the troops in this sector, who were well dug in, weathered it without serious casualties. But the Japanese kept on coming on, wave after wave of them streaming over the road, scrambling up the steep slopes, and pushing on through the undergrowth. Eventually the garrison troops had to withdraw, and take up a position behind the bungalow. Here our troops were dug in along the banks at the western end of the tennis court and fought back with grenades; the Japs replied by hurling their own grenades from the other end of the tennis court. So this small rectangular area became the ‘No Man’s Land’ between the garrison and the Japanese and was to remain so for some weeks, the focus of some of the bloodiest fighting in the whole battle. To restore the situation, Richards ordered a counter-attack by platoons of the Assam Regiment and the Burma Regiment, and later the Royal West Kents attacked. These had only limited success, and most of the area the Japs had captured they were able to retain. A man who distinguished himself again in this night of bloody and confused fighting was the gunner, Dick Yeo. As Richards records: ‘He controlled the defensive fire with great accuracy, and was able to bring it down on call at an incredibly short distance in front of our troops. There is no doubt that this fire resulted time and again in breaking up the Japanese attacks. We could hear their screams as it fell among them.’

  On the morning of the 9th, the Japanese still went on attacking to extend their gains on I.G.H. Spur; but the attacks were held. Then the ground lost the previous night was heavily mortared and Colonel Keene put in a counter-attack with two platoons of the Assam Rifles to recover most of the area. In the afternoon the enemy began mortaring the F.S.D. area, though no attack developed. Intermittent shelling continued all day. Inevitably, some shells fell among the wounded lying in the open around the A.D.S., and it was learned that forty had been killed.

  Water was becoming a pressing problem, as nothing came through the pipes any more and the tanks were holed by shell-fire. Fortunately, Colonel Keene had discovered a spring in a re-entrant running into the side of I.G.H. Spur and, as news of this got round, men came scrambling over the hill to fill chagals and water-bottles. It was obvious, however, that if this practice went on there’d be far too many casualties, so water parties were organized which crawled forward at night. The ration was fixed at three-quarters of a pint per man per day—enough to sustain life but not much more.

  The 9th April was Easter Sunday. It was impossible to bring men together in the Kohima box to celebrate this great day in the Christian calendar, but at Bokajan the padres of all denominations put on their jungle-green surplices, set up their mobile altars, and celebrated Holy Communion on the fringes of the jungle. Many officers and men attended these services, kneeling on the muddy jungle floor with their weapons by their side. There was no music and little singing, and very often the voices of the padres were drowned by the roar of trucks, which came slithering along the tracks, and punctuated by the chatter of the refugees streaming by, or of the stragglers from the detachment which had bolted from G.P.T. Ridge, who were now being questioned at the Field Security Collecting Post. But the services were very real, and to some men unbearably moving, as they realized they might well be hearing the familiar words of the service for the last time. For many this was the case.

  While the services were going on at Bokajan, and Colonel Keene was launching his counter-attack on I.G.H. Spur, Stopford and Grover were in conference with Ranking at Dimapur. The 124th Regiment had now been identified, so it was clear that a whole Japanese Division was now operating in the area, and plans had to be laid on that basis. As Grover had nearly half of his division now concentrated, it was agreed that he should take operational control of all the area forward of Dimapur, while Ranking should remain responsible for the railway. Grover’s orders (which were later formalized at a meeting in the evening) were to open the road to Kohima, clear it of the enemy before the monsoon, and secure it as a firm base for further offensive operations. Operations were to start at once.

  At this stage, Grover, who had only arrived on the 1st April, had not seen Kohima nor any of the mountainous country beyond Nichugard. He appreciated, however, that Kohima would be the stage for his first major battle and studied it carefully on the map. He noticed that on the right flank the high ground ran up towards Mount Pulebadze and Mount Japvo, and came to the immediate conclusion that the best way to deal with the situation was to put in a left hook with two brigades via the Merema Ridge. The importance of this latter feature struck him forcibly: it overlooked the whole length of the road from Zubza to Kohima; and if the Japs got astride it with any considerable force of artillery, they could paralyse the movement of both men and supplies. But when he made this early plan, Grover still imagined that there would only be a Jap regiment at Kohima; and he could not
know that in Assam maps can only give a very feeble impression of the ground.

  It was an uncomfortable night both at Jotsoma and Kohima. The sky was covered by black clouds and then the rain came down, soaking the men in the slit trenches and the wounded lying out in the open. At Jotsoma there were sporadic attacks, and forward positions in the Punjabis’ area changed hands time and again, as desperate, hand-to-hand fighting blurred the edges of the perimeter. At 2200 hours the Japanese at Kohima put in an attack across the tennis court, and kept it going for an hour and a half; but automatic fire, well directed and controlled, supported by a liberal use of hand grenades kept them at bay. On the far side of the tennis court, the shells brought down by Major Yeo’s orders were forming a curtain, cutting off the movement of reinforcements, and for long periods it was only twenty-five yards in front of the perimeter. The second attack came against the Assam Rifles on the I.G.H. Spur, but they held it without trouble. It was put in by companies of the 13 8th Regiment, and an identification was obtained. The garrison had for some days suspected that they had three regiments against them and now they had proof of two at least. The third attack came in against the Royal West Kents in the D.I.S. area, and was preceded by a shower of grenades, fired from discharger cups. The Japs could not break the line, but some took refuge in trenches evacuated by the wounded, and from these they were able to make life very uncomfortable for the section posts near them.

  By now, after five days of siege, corpses, Japanese, Indian and British, were littering the hillside; the smell was obnoxious and the flies were a constant torment. Unfortunately, there was an acute shortage of shovels and entrenching tools and some units, like the Assam Rifles, had none at all, as they weren’t on their establishment. The Royal West Kents, quite understandably, were unwilling to lend their entrenching tools, so the corpses lay where they were, black and swelling. To make matters worse, the garrison were now beginning to realize that Warren and the two remaining battalions of 161st Brigade wouldn’t be able to help them, except with their guns; and the 2nd Division in Dimapur seemed a long, long way away. All they could do was go on fighting and hoping; they’d no illusions as to what would happen if the position were over-run.

  But the situation was changing, if slowly and painfully. On the 10th April, Victor Hawkins summoned his battalion commanders and gave out his orders. His staff were to work all night laying on transport for the whole brigade, which at first light the following morning was to leave the hot, humid, flea-ridden atmosphere of Dimapur and move forward into battle. The brigade’s orders were to open the road, make contact with the 161st Brigade, and be prepared to capture Kohima.

  1 In fact, by the one 25-pounder in the garrison.

  2 The Rajputs are a tall, martial race from Rajputana, a province in North-West India.

  3 The 2nd Battalion, 58th Regiment was to lose no less than four commanding officers at Kohima: Nageie, Shiro Sato, Takeo Igawa, and Torao Ishida.

  5

  A Phase is Ended

  Grover had made his first contact with Warren by radio at 1115 hours on the 10th April, after jeeping forward to milestone 32. The most pressing job was to clear the roadblock separating them, and Warren thought he could tackle this. If he failed, however, the job would obviously have to wait for the 5th Brigade, when they advanced up the road. Regarding the situation in Kohima, Warren seemed pessimistic and put forward the idea that the whole garrison, including the Royal West Kents, should be withdrawn to an area by milestone 43 that night. Grover forbade any such move, as it would open the road to the enemy and might interfere with 5th Brigade’s move forward. There would also be grave political consequences. However, Grover could see some sense in Warren’s suggestion and decided to discuss it with Stopford. It was clear even now that once a road had been blasted into Kohima the garrison would have to be relieved—an operation which would tie up a brigade of the 2nd Division, so making it unavailable for movement. Later on, Grover discussed the matter with Stopford, who, having referred to Slim, gave him discretion to act as he saw fit.

  By the afternoon a further message had come from Warren, indicating that he couldn’t move the road block, so two companies of the Worcesters were ordered forward. Grover’s appreciation was that the Japs were abandoning frontal attacks on Kohima and working their way along the flanks. His policy to counter this was to build up a strong force forward, to keep the road open to Dimapur by armoured car patrols, and to protect Dimapur from a position at Nichugard.

  Early on the nth the Brigade moved forward to join the Worcester-shires, who were already in action in the Zubza area. One company had moved off at 0200 hours with the object of making a flanking move above the road, then getting into a position to protect the sappers who were to mend a blown bridge. Unfortunately, the company came down on to the road short of the bridge, so was ordered to keep going along in the open to a bend. Here the road disappeared round a knoll, and a spur jutted out to the left. When the leading troops were about fifteen yards from the bend, the Japanese opened up from a position on the spur, and the company, sustained some casualties before it could extricate itself. Major Elliott put in an attack against the Japanese on the spur (which commanded the blown bridge, as well as the road), but, owing to lack of supporting fire, his company made little progress.

  Meanwhile the Brigadier had ordered Jack Stocker, the commanding officer of the Worcestershires, to form a perimeter in Zubza, and his men began working their way up from the road towards the jungle-covered hills behind. Here a platoon of Japs was found digging in and, having no weapons with them, bolted to another position already completed, from which they began sniping. Fortunately a gunner officer had gone up to join the Worcestershires and a quick shoot was put in, after which the infantry went in with the bayonet. This little operation was the brigade’s first success.

  But things on the whole were unsatisfactory, the brigade having surged forward and got itself rather disorganized. Brigadier Hawkins recorded: ‘As I looked around it dawned on me that everyone was acting as if they were on an exercise. I suppose we had done so many exercises, and made them as real as we could, that the chaps were finding it difficult to realize that they were up against the real thing at last.’ It was at this precise moment that the Japanese chose to administer a stern reminder. Seeing the Worcestershires gaily moving around in Zubza village, a 75-mm. gun opened up from Merema Ridge, killing the padre and a sapper subaltern, and wounding a company commander, apart from some N.C.O.s and men. After chis, things began to settle down.

  The obvious thing now was to get to grips with the main Jap position to the left of the road, so Hawkins went forward with Stocker to carry out a reconnaissance. His immediate decision was that the position was a fairly strong one and ‘it was no use pecking at it… we had got to find out all about it first, and then hit it hard.’ This meant waiting till the guns could be got into position off the road in a ‘shootable’ position, the tanks brought up, and an air-strike laid on with the R.A.F., but Hawkins considered the delay was worth it. If the brigade could kick off with a solid success morale would be boosted enormously; and the brigade would then be ready for the sterner tasks that lay immediately ahead.

  It was at this moment that Grover arrived, heard what had happened, and urged Hawkins to get on. But, standing his ground, Hawkins said: ‘Please don’t make me put in an attack before I’m ready.’ Grover just had time to agree when the Jap 75-mm. opened up again. Brigadier Burke, the divisional C.R.A. who was with him, became furious that the gunners of the 10th Field Regiment who were just moving in made no attempt to reply, and upbraided the nearest officer he could find. The latter replied that the guns supporting the Worcestershires were in no position to answer, and this produced such an explosion from Burke that a couple of them were moved in a matter of minutes and went into action. To do them justice, the gunners were never caught with their trousers down again.

  In between these alarms and excursions Hawkins found time to take a look at the country toward
s Kohima, and ‘was a bit worried’ by what he saw. The vast size of the hills, the valleys, the spurs, the re-entrants suddenly rendered his original order ‘to prepare to take Kohima’ somewhat unrealistic. The valley between the road and Merema Ridge was over two miles wide and 1,500 feet deep, and Kohima Ridge, which formed a great concave bastion at the far end of it, looked the most formidable defensive obstacle he’d ever seen. In view of this, he asked Pat Burke to have a word with Grover to see if the orders could be modified, which he did. But there was no need for any prolonged discussion; Grover had realized instantly that ‘Orders off the map’ would be somewhat useless in this campaign. As he put it: ‘The country is very big… it rapidly absorbs large numbers of troops.’

  Faced with this situation, Grover took Hawkins with him and they went forward to nave a good look at the ground ahead of them. After some discussion, Grover laid down that the orders to clear the ground and link up with 161st Brigade should still stand, but that after this had been accomplished Hawkins should work out a plan with Warren for an operation by both brigades. Here the matter was left.